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Abstract
The article provides a panoramic overview of  the factual and legal problems 
created by transnational business activities that negatively impact human 
rights around the world, and critically analyzes the strengths and gaps of  
the various international initiatives created in order to address businesses 
impact on human rights. The main three international initiatives analyzed 
are the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights, and the Draft Treaty 
on Business and Human Rights. The article intends to organize the vast 
literature on BHR, serve as a departure point for those interested in rese-
arching on this sub-area of  international human rights law, and to provide 
critical analysis of  the international legal responses created to address these 
contemporary human rights
Keywords: Business and Human Rights. Corporate Accountability. UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. National Action Plans. 
Treaty on Business and Human Rights.
Resumen
Este articulo ofrece una visión panorámica de los problemas facticos y 
jurídicos creados por las actividades de empresas transnacionales alrededor 
del mundo, y analiza críticamente las fortalezas y debilidades de las diversas 
iniciativas internacionales creadas con el propósito de regular el impacto de 
las empresas sobre los derechos humanos. Las tres iniciativas internacionales 
en las que se enfoca el artículo son: los Principios Rectores de Empresas y 
Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, planes de Acción Nacional sobre 
empresas y derechos humanos, y el borrador de tratado sobre empresa y 
derechos humanos. El articulo pretende presentar el estado del arte sobre 
el desarrollo normativo en relación con el problema de derechos huma-
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nos trasnacional causado por empresas, establecer un 
putno de partido para aqullos interesado en enseñar o 
investigar en esta sub-area de los derechos humanos, 
y analizar críticamente las diversas respuestas jurídicas 
para enfrentar esta problemática contemporánea de la 
protección internacional de los derechos humanos. 
Palabras claves: Empresa y Derechos Humanos. Re-
sponsabilidad Empresarial. Principios Rectores de Em-
presa y Derechos Humanos. Planes de Acción Nacio-
nal. Tratado sobre empresa y derechos humanos.
Resumo
Este artigo oferece uma visão panorâmica dos proble-
mas fatuais e legais criados pelas atividades de empresas 
transnacionais e analisa criticamente os pontos fortes e 
fracos das várias iniciativas internacionais criadas com 
o objetivo de regular o impacto das empresas nos direi-
tos humanos. As três iniciativas internacionais em que o 
artigo se concentra são: os Princípios Orientadores das 
Nações Unidas sobre Empresas e Direitos Humanos, 
os Planos de Ação Nacionais sobre empresas e direi-
tos humanos e o projeto de tratado sobre empresas e 
direitos humanos. O artigo tem como objetivo apre-
sentar o estado da arte do desenvolvimento normativo 
em relação ao problema transnacional de direitos hu-
manos causado pelas empresas, estabelecer um local de 
festa para os interessados  em ensinar ou pesquisar ne-
sta subárea de direitos humanos e analisar criticamente 
as várias respostas legais para enfrentar esse problema 
contemporâneo de proteção internacional dos direitos
Palavras-chave: Empresas e Direitos Humanos. Re-
sponsabilidade das empresas. Princípios Orientadores 
das Nações Unidas sobre Empresas e Direitos Huma-
nos. Plano de Ação Nacional. Tratdo sobre empresas e 
Direitos Humanos
1 Introduction
The purpose of  this article is to analyze the proble-
ms of  negative human rights impacts caused by cor-
porations and to provide an overview of  the current 
state of  the business and human rights field. There is a 
considerable amount of  literature on this topic that has 
grown in an important way in recent years. This article 
provides a general introduction to the business and hu-
man rights debate from the perspective of  international 
law and human rights. This means it leaves aside the 
responsibility of  businesses developed in the field of  
business ethics or other areas of  law such as investment 
law, international trade, or corporate law.  
 The article firstly explores the factual relationship 
between businesses and human rights and the reality of  
the increasingly negative human rights impacts that pri-
vate business entities are producing around the world, 
which justifies the endeavor of  this research. Questions 
such as what rights have been violated and in what way 
and what kind of  corporation is responsible for such 
violations are some of  the issues explore in this section. 
Secondly, the article describes the regulatory problem 
that transnational corporations (TNCs) have caused 
and the limits of  domestic law to regulate these entities, 
which explains the need for international law to get in-
volved with what traditionally has been considered crea-
tures of  domestic law. 
 Thirdly, the article briefly describes the state of  the 
business and human rights (BHR) field, summarized 
into three areas: 1) the United Nations Guiding Prin-
ciples (UNGPs)2 as the focal point of  the BHR move-
ment, 2) national action plans, and 3) the binding treaty 
debate. It goes beyond the length of  this article to ex-
plore other areas of  development of  the debate about 
the responsibility of  corporations for human rights vio-
lations such as 4) transnational human rights litigation, 
5) international soft law initiatives such as the OECD 
Guidelines or the International Labor Organization’s 
Tripartite Declaration, and the growing number of  6) 
Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSI). The article provi-
des a panoramic view of  the relationship between bu-
siness and human rights as a starting point for those 
engaged in the field advising governments or corpo-
rations or working in NGOs dedicate to this sub area 
of  human rights. Furthermore, this article constitutes 
a useful tool for law professors and students interested 
in the intersection of  businesses and human rights as a 
departing point of  further debate.  
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2  Business negative impact on human 
rights and the legal challenge
A six-month research project developed by the 
Guardian revealed that slaves coming from Burma and 
other Asian countries have been forced for years to 
work in Thai fishing boats in the production of  shrimps 
sold by some of  the major retailer companies in the 
world for no pay and under threat of  extreme violen-
ce.1 Some of  these retailers are Walmart, Costco, Tesco, 
Aldi, and Carrefour who sell shrimp in the U.S., UK, 
and other western countries. It is estimated that around 
270,000 migrants work in the fishing industry and are 
kept as property in Thai fishing boats sometimes on the 
high seas or in Thailand’s waters. In fact, the Thai go-
vernment estimates that around 300,000 people work 
in the fishing industry but that the majority of  them 
are unregistered migrants who are effectively ghosts to 
the authorities. The workers are commonly trafficked 
migrants passing through the Thai borders in very dan-
gerous circumstances and are purchased by boat cap-
tains for around $312 (250 sterling pounds) per person. 
Survivors who escaped from these vessels recount that 
they were constantly threatened, chained, malnouri-
shed, beaten, and in several occasions, they witnessed 
extrajudicial killings of  their peers at the hands of  boat 
captains.2
Like these examples, it is estimated that there are 
more than 21 million people in the world living under 
some form of  modern slavery, of  which 78% are slaves 
related to forced labor, 22% are sexual victims, and 26% 
are children.3 Kevin Bales first used the term modern 
slavery started in his book Disposable People: New Slavery 
in the Global Economy published in 1999.4 TNCs parti-
cipate in modern slavery mainly through their supply 
1 Kate Hodal & Chris Kelly Felicity Lawrence, Revealed: Asian slave 
labour producing prawns for supermarkets in US, UK, The Guardian, June 
10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/
jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour (last 
visited July 29, 2019).
2 Kate Hodal & Chris Kelly Felicity Lawrence, Revealed: Asian slave 
labour producing prawns for supermarkets in US, UK, The Guardian, June 
10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/
jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour (last 
visited July 29, 2019).
3 Bales Kevin, Disposable people new slavery in the global econ-
omy (2d ed. 2012). See also, Slavery Today « Free the Slaves, http://
www.freetheslaves.net/about-slavery/slavery-today/ (last visited Jul 
29, 2019).
4 Bales, suprote 30
chain that is poorly monitored and that lack due dili-
gence in regard to those from whom they are buying.5 
Moreover, businesses entities directly contribute to 
modern slavery since slavery itself  is a relevant (if  not 
essential) element to some industries such as brick pro-
duction in Pakistan,6 shrimp fishing in Thailand, coal 
mining in Brazil, 7 or cotton production in Egypt.8 The 
slavers themselves are “businessmen” with a profit mo-
tivation who usually operate along the thin line between 
legality and illegality. Accordingly, modern slavery is a 
result of  the culture in which profit triumphs human 
considerations.
Business impact on human rights is not limited to 
apparel manufacturing, extractive industries nor only to 
transnational corporations. Businesses of  all types in-
cluding small, large, domestic and international can and 
do have an impact on human rights.9 In fact, a study 
made by the Special Representative of  the Secretary-
-General on the issue of  Human Rights and Transnatio-
nal Corporations and Other Business Enterprises10re-
vealed that the complaints of  direct violation of  human 
rights by business entities were presented against eight 
of  the nine main business sectors, excluding only the 
financial service sector.11 Nevertheless, since the report 
was presented there have been several reports of  the 
negative human rights impact of  the financial sector, 
5 See Modern Slavery in Supply Chains, CORE, http://corporate-
responsibility.org/issues/modern-slavery-bill/ (last visited Jul 29, 
2019).
6 Bales Kevin, Disposable people new slavery in the global econo-
my (2d ed. 2012).  at.149
7 Bales Kevin, Disposable people new slavery in the global econo-
my (2d ed. 2012). at.149
8 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Underaged and Unprotected 
(2001), https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/01/01/underaged-and-
unprotected/child-labor-egypts-cotton-fields (last visited Jul 29, 
2019).
9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “On the Margins of  Profit: Rights 
at Risk in the Global Economy”, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/bhr0208webwcover.pdf. p.2 (last visited July 
29, 2019) [Here in after HRW, On the Margins of  Profit].
10 Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  
Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business 
Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of  The Scope 
and Patterns of  Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse UN. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 2008 (By John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Re-
port Add.2 2008] p. 23. (Las visited July 29, 2019).
11 Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  
Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business 
Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of  The Scope 
and Patterns of  Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse UN. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 2008 (By John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Re-
port Add.2 2008] p. 23. (Las visited July 29, 2019).
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too.12 Indeed, BanckTrack reports that “Banks can cau-
se human rights violations themselves, such as through 
discrimination in their hiring or service provision, and 
they can contribute or be linked to human rights viola-
tions through lending or other financial support for the 
companies responsible.”13
Business entities affect – directly and indirectly – al-
most all human rights recognized in international human 
rights law: e.g. rights to work, food, clothing, and the 
freedoms of  speech, association, and conscience. Howe-
ver, there has been a special focus on gross human rights 
violations or crimes against humanity probably because 
of  its severity and the visibility of  such violations throu-
gh transnational litigation.14 The non-labor rights most 
cited or allegedly violated were the right to health viola-
ted in cases of  exposure to pollutants and other toxins; 
the right to life and personal integrity; and the rights to an 
adequate standard for living. 15 The third most frequen-
tly violated rights were related to communities displaced 
by extractive projects which included failure to obtain 
informed consent and inadequate compensation. The 
victims were composed of  workers and communities in 
equal parts and were primarily product end-users.16
Furthermore, corporate human rights violations oc-
curred all over the world. It is not possible to restrict the 
problem to one country or even to a single continent 
because modern businesses’ transactions are transna-
tional and involve several jurisdictions. However, there 
is some geographical concentration of  human rights 
violations and common patterns. According to the Spe-
cial Representative’s report, the human rights violations 
12 United Nations Environment Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), 
“Banks and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis” http://www.unepfi.
org/publications/social-issues-publications/banks-and-human-
rights-a-legal-analysis-2/ (last visited July 29, 2019).
13 Banktrack, Banks and human rights, https://www.banktrack.
org/campaign/banks_and_human_rights (last visited July 29, 2019).
14 See, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
15 Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  
Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business 
Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of  The Scope 
and Patterns of  Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse UN. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 2008 (By John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Re-
port Add.2 2008] p. 23.
16 For a complete discussion of  the main findings of  the updated 
report: Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of  Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of  The 
Scope and Patterns of  Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse UN. 
Doc.  A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 2008 (By John Ruggie) [hereinafter Rug-
gie Report Add.2 2008] p. 22-25.
took place in sixteen countries from the four regions 
with the biggest concentration of  developing countries: 
Africa, Asia - Pacific, and Latin America.17 Neverthe-
less, there were also reported violations in North Ame-
rica and Europe but in smaller proportions.18 An addi-
tional geographical aspect of  the problem is that the 
majority of  TNCs have been incorporated in developed 
countries. 
This led us to another issue which is the unmatched 
challenge of  regulating businesses’ negative impact on 
human rights. Traditionally, business entities as creatures 
of  national law were regulated by states that are interna-
tionally responsible for protecting every person within 
their territories or jurisdiction from third persons, inclu-
ding business entities, who would violate the rights of  
nationals or non-nationals within their territory or juris-
diction.19 Nevertheless, the globalization phenomenon, 
the increase of  power of  business entities, in particular 
of  transnational corporations, and the problem of  sta-
tes with low governance (especially when due to armed 
conflicts) have rendered traditional approaches to cor-
porate responsibility ineffective and inadequate. Legal 
systems remain largely national while many large corpo-
rations are multinational. As a consequence, “multina-
tional corporations have long outgrown legal structures 
than govern them, reaching a level of  transnationality 
and economic power that exceeds domestic law’s ability 
to impose basic human rights norms”.20 When the pro-
blem of  businesses’ negative impact on human rights 
became a transnational problem, national norms were 
found insufficient.
The problem consists of  a lack of  regulation, a “go-
vernance gap”,21 between the national norms regulating 
17 Ruggie Report “A Survey of  The Scope” Add.2 2008 par. 40.
18 According to Ruggie, in this matter the report “cannot be taken 
as a conclusive evidence that there are fewer cases of  cooperate- re-
lated human rights abuse in Europe and Norte America than else-
where. What it does indicate is that there are far more cases in the 
Asia- Pacific region, Africa, and Latin America than are not being 
dealt with effectively through exiting forums, or that such forums 
don’t exist there in the first place”. Ruggie report Report “A Survey 
of  The Scope” Add.2 2008.
19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] art. 2; UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), General comment no. 31, The Nature of  The General Le-
gal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to The Covenant, par. 10 UN. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1, 2004. 
20 Stephens Beth, “The Amorality of  Profit: Transnational Corpo-
rations and Human Rights”, Berkeley J. Int’l L. 2002, 20, pp.54-60. 
21 Ruggie Report “A Survey of  The Scope” Add.2 2008.
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corporate behavior of  the home and host country and 
the inadequacy of  international law – tailored traditio-
nally to states – to regulate business entities. Home sta-
tes norms are limited by rules of  jurisdiction and other 
states’ sovereignty, so they cannot be enforced by any 
entity outside the territorial jurisdiction of  the country 
where the business has been incorporated.22 Moreover, 
the host country sometimes lacks 1) adequate norms for 
regulating transnational business entities; 2) the political 
will to do so due to benefits governments receive from 
business entities’ negative impacts on human rights; or 
3) a sufficient degree of  governance due to institutions 
that are incapable of  enforcing existing human rights 
norms.23 
National norms, like any other norms, are only as 
strong as their enforcement capacity. In many countries, 
even if  these standards exist, the state’s unwillingness 
or inability to enforce them leaves a serious legal gap 
for TNCs that perform activities in those countries. 
For instance, in Unilever experience, in some States, 
the legal minimum wage is even lower than the poverty 
minimum.24 This situation places business entities in a 
difficult position even when goodwill is present.   
In addition, corporations have learned to evade sta-
te power and the constraints of  regulations by moving 
their operations around the world according to criteria 
of  economic efficiency while state regulatory schemes 
are preeminently domestic and based on national laws 
and administrative bodies.25 Similarly, corporate structu-
re, the complex relationship between parents and subsi-
diaries, and the impossibility of  piercing the corporate 
veil are used as a means of  avoiding legal liability. Many 
cases against corporations in domestic tribunals have 
been dismissed on these grounds.26  
22 Farah Youseph, “Toward a Multi-Directional Approach to Cor-
porate Accountability”, in Accountability in the Context of  Transitional 
Justice Corporate, Routledge, 2014. pp. 32-42.
23 This last is usually the case in conflict zones or post-conflict 
zones where the risk for new conflicts is high and the institutions 
are very weak. 
24 Oxfam, “Labour Rights in Unilever’s Supply Chain: From Com-
pliance towards Good Practice”, 2013 https://www.unilever.com/
Images/rr-unilever-supply-chain-labour-rights-vietnam-310113-en_
tcm244-409769_en.pdf  (last visited July 29, 2019).
25 Stephens “The Amorality of  Profit”, p. 59.
26 Recently, the UK High Court dismissed a case against Shell by 
two poor communities in the Niger Delta. The case was dismissed 
on the grounds of  the separation between the parent corporation 
and the subsidiary.  Joe Westby, “An elusive justice—holding par-
ent companies accountable for human rights abuse”, open Democ-
racy, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/
Moreover, developing countries have been concer-
ned to integrate their economies into the global eco-
nomy in a manner that ensures the inflows of  new 
investment capital under the idea that this means de-
velopment. Consequently, in the race for economic 
growth, states usually agree to low standards of  beha-
vior for multinational corporations since they are the 
main channels of  direct foreign investment.27 
On the other hand, economic power carries poli-
tical influence. Corporations play an important role in 
negotiations over issues related to international trade, 
patent protection, natural resources regulations, and 
international and national economic policy. The reali-
ty is that governments are coalitions that represent a 
variety of  interests, and corporations are able to use 
their bargaining skills and economic power to influence 
national and international politics through lobbying or 
other means.28 In the face of  the unequal economic and 
political power between some states and corporations 
and the insufficiency of  domestic legal systems, it seems 
that international law is the body of  law suited for the 
task. However, even if  that is true, we should not be 
too ready to leave the conversation about domestic law 
as a means of  addressing the corporate human rights 
problem if  we consider the possibility of  the extraterri-
torial effects of  domestic norms.
According to the Special Representative John Ru-
ggie, states have adopted two legal ways to regulate 
issues beyond their territory: domestic measures with 
extraterritorial implications and the exercise of  direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over private actors or activi-
joe-westby/elusive-justice-holding-parent-companies-accounta-
ble-for-human-rights-ab (last visited July 29, 2019; Jennifer Zerk, 
“Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a 
Fairer and More Effective System of  Domestic Law Remedies”, 
2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Do-
mesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf; Gwynne 
Skinner, Robert McCorquodale and Oliver De Schutter, “The Third 
Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by 
Transnational Business”, 2013, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/58657dfa6a4963597fed59
8b/1483046398204/The-Third-Pillar-FINAL1.pdf; Office of  the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Initiative on Enhancing Ac-
countability and Access to Remedy in Cases of  Business Involvement in Human 
Rights Abuses, 2015 http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx.
27 Olivier De Schutter, Foreign Direct Investment and Human Devel-
opment: The Law and Economics of  International Investment Agreements. 
London: Routledge, 2013.
28 Stephens “The Amorality of  Profit”, p. 58.
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ties abroad.29 Although, the use of  direct extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is often problematic because of  the politi-
cal and legal relevance of  territorial sovereignty, state 
practice has shown that it is becoming more common 
and accepted to use direct extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to regulate “criminal activity such as terrorism, money 
laundering, corruption, grave human rights breaches, 
and “sex tourism”30. 
3  International legal initiatives 
on businesses’ responsibility for 
human rights
Different actors and groups have attempted in diver-
se ways to reduce the “governance gap”31 and to meet 
the challenge that business entities present for human 
rights. Some business sectors have attempted to self-
-regulate; human rights activists and civil society have 
brought transnational business entities to civil and cri-
minal courts; international organizations have produced 
29 UN Guiding Principles p. 7.  According to Jennifer Zerk: “Extra-
territoriality is not a binary matter: it comprises a range of  measures. 
Indeed, one can imagine a matrix, with two rows and three columns. 
Its rows would be domestic measures with extraterritorial implica-
tions; and direct extraterritorial jurisdiction over actors or activities 
abroad. Its columns would be public policies for companies (such 
as CSR and public procurement policies, export credit agency crite-
ria, or consular support); regulation (through corporate law, for in-
stance); and enforcement actions (adjudicating alleged breaches and 
enforcing judicial and executive decisions). Their combination yields 
six types of  ‘extraterritorial’ form, each in turn offering a range of  
options.”  Jennifer A Zerk, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons 
for The Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory 
Areas”, 2010, pp. 16-18, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/
download/67817/1244078/version/1/file/workingpaper_59_zerk.
pdf; Surya Deva. “Corporate Code of  Conduct Bill 2000: Overcom-
ing Hurdles in Enforcing Human Rights Obligations against Over-
seas Corporate Hands of  Local Corporations International Law and 
Human Rights.”  Newcastle Law Review 2004, 8 pp. 87-116.
30 Zerk, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, p. 5. 
31 “The root cause of  the business and human rights predicament 
today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization - between 
the scope and impact of  economic forces and actors, and the capaci-
ty of  societies to manage their adverse consequences. These govern-
ance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by 
companies of  all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 
How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human 
rights is our fundamental challenge.” Special Representative of  the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporation and Other Business Enterprises, Corporations and Hu-
man Rights: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights par. 3 UN. Doc.  A/HRC/8/5, 2008 (By John Ruggie) 
[Hereinafter Ruggie Report 2008].
several guidelines regarding business and human rights, 
and some states have even tried implementing new 
norms to regulate their business entities abroad. The 
result of  all these efforts is a multidirectional approa-
ch to corporate human rights responsibility through at 
least five principal avenues: corporate codes of  con-
ducts based on self-regulation (or Multi - Stakeholders 
Initiatives),32 soft-law initiatives issued by international 
organizations,33 extraterritorial regulations,34 transnatio-
nal litigation, and contractualization of  human rights.35 
Furthermore, there are ongoing debates about the crea-
tion of  a treaty to regulate business entities’ impacts 
on human rights, but this is still in its earliest phases.36 
None of  these initiatives are perfect or complete indi-
vidually, but together they create a complex matrix that 
attempts to regulate business entities. 
Yet the more initiatives for regulating corporate im-
pact on human rights proliferate and create different stan-
dards, the more disarticulated those initiatives become. 
Most are based on voluntary implementation and weak 
enforcement mechanisms. And even when legal avenues 
of  enforcement such as contract law, investment law, and 
civil and criminal litigation are used, these avenues often 
obtain inadequate reparations for human rights victims, 
since they were originally designed to protect legal goods 
different from those protected by human rights law. 
32 Murphy Sean D, “Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of  
Conduct to the Next Level Essays in Honor of  Oscar Schachter”, 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L., 2004, 43, p. 391.
33 Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Sarah Altschuller, Anna Dolize, Mi-
chael Fessler, “Corporate Social Responsibility”, Int’l Law., 2012, 
46, p. 181; Josep Lozano, and Maria Prandi. “Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Human Rights” In Corporate Social Responsibility: The 
Corporate Governance Of  The 21st Century, Kluwer Law International, 
2011. The most relevant initiatives developed by international or-
ganizations are the United Nations Global Compact (UN Global 
Compact), the European Union Green Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Green Paper), the OECD “Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises” (OECD Guidelines), and the International Fi-
nance Corporation Sustainability Framework (IFC). 
34 Zerk, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, p. 16. 
35 Farah, “Toward a Multi-Directional Approach”, p. 40.
36 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of  Hu-
man Rights, Norms on the responsibilities of  Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN ES-
COR, 55th sess, 2 2nd mtg, Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [hereinafter UN Sub-Commission Norms] 
Office of  the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reports 
and other documents of  the Working Group on the Issue of  Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx (last vis-
ited Aug 22, 2017).; Olivier De Schutter, “Towards a New Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights”, Business and Human Rights Journal, 
2016, 1, pp. 41–67.
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The international community has made several at-
tempts to regulate the conduct of  transnational corpo-
rations, not only regarding human rights but corpora-
tions’ ethical behavior and their impact on society more 
generally. In 1976, the OECD published the Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises,37 and later in 1977 the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of  Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.38 In 2003, 
the UN Sub commission on Human Rights proposed 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of  Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights.39 This initiative imposed legal 
obligations on transnational corporations40and states, 
which included periodical reports, implementation of  
domestic and internal measures, and accountability for 
human rights violations. However, this proposal was ar-
chived due to a lack of  international consent. The failu-
re of  these initiatives has been attributed to the interna-
tional community’s reluctance to create binding norms 
directed exclusively for the regulation of  corporations, 
states’ concern about the excessive intervention of  in-
ternational law in their domestic affairs, and the con-
cerns raised by the possible negative effects of  this re-
gulation on the competitiveness of  their corporations.41
3.1 United Nation Guiding Principles (UNGP)
In an attempt to coordinate the business and hu-
man rights movement, in 2005, the UN Human Rights 
37 The OECD guidelines are “Recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from ad-
hering countries. They provide non-binding principles and stand-
ards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent 
with applicable laws and internationally recognized standards” Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/
guidelines/ (last visited July 29, 2019).
38 Tripartite Declaration of  Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) - 4th Edition, 
2017, http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/
lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 29, 2019).
39 UN Sub-Commission Norms.
40  UN Sub-Commission Norms p. 10 “Transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises shall recognize and respect applicable 
norms of  international law, national laws and regulations, as well as 
administrative practices, the rule of  law, the public interest, devel-
opment objectives, social, economic and cultural policies including 
transparency, accountability and prohibition of  corruption, and au-
thority of  the countries in which the enterprises operate”.
41 Pini Pavel Miretski & Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “The UN 
Norms on the Responsibility of  Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights: A Req-
uiem”, Deakin L. Rev., 2012, 17, p. 5–42.
Commission established a mandate for a Special Repre-
sentative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Hu-
man Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises (Special Representative) with the 
purpose of  “identify[ing] and clarify[ing] existing stan-
dards and practices” regarding business and human ri-
ghts.42 Professor John Ruggie was appointed the Special 
Representative by the former Secretary General of  the 
United Nation, and in 2007 the Human Rights Cou-
ncil (before the Human Rights Commission) renewed 
his mandate for an additional year. After this time, one 
of  the main observations of  the Special Representati-
ve was that there were a number of  public and priva-
te initiatives regarding business and human rights, but 
none of  the initiatives “had reached sufficient scale to 
truly move markets; they existed as separate fragments 
that did not add up to a coherent or complementary 
system.”43
Therefore, in 2008 the Special Representative asked 
the Council to adopt the “Protect, Respect, and Reme-
dy” framework44that he developed as a common ground 
for all BHR initiatives. The framework establishes a duty 
of  states to protect human rights, a corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights, and a need to provide 
effective remedies for victims of  human rights abuses 
by corporations. The Council adopted the framework 
in Resolution 8/7, extended the Special Representative’s 
mandate until June 2011, and asked him to advance a set 
of  guiding principles that could become the common 
ground for the business and human rights initiatives.45
Consequently, the Special Representative led a multi 
stakeholder process with the participation of  business, 
academics, governments, human rights organizations, 
and other international organizations that culminated 
with the proposal of  thirty-one principles that should 
guide states and corporations with respect to their res-
ponsibilities and duties regarding human rights. The 
United Nation Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
42 UN Guiding Principles. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 
August. 2019).
43 UN Guiding Principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/docu-
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las vis-
ited 01 August. 2019). 
44 UN Guiding Principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/docu-
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las vis-
ited 01 August. 2019).
45 UN Guiding Principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/docu-
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las vis-
ited 01 August. 2019). 
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man Rights (UNGPs) were endorsed by the UN Human 
Rights Council on June 2011,46 and since then, became 
the main focal point of  the business and human rights 
movement and the different BHR initiatives.47  
The UNGPs are the result of  a “practical consen-
sus” among many but not all the different stakeholders 
of  the business and human rights world about the duty 
of  corporations to respect human rights. The UNGPs 
form the focal point of  the business and human rights 
initiatives and the guidance for further action, which 
may be compared to what the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights represents for the entire human rights 
project.48 A relevant section of  human rights advocates 
and some developing countries have been dissatisfied 
with the “softness” of  the UNGPs, but a second at-
tempt of  creating a binding treaty on business and hu-
man rights has taken its place.49 
The thirty-one Guiding Principles are divided into 
three parts according to the pillars of  the “protect, res-
pect, and remedy” framework proposed by the Special 
Representative: (1) the state duty to protect human ri-
ghts; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights; and (3) access to effective remedy for victims.50 
Each pillar is composed of  two kinds of  principles: 
foundational and operational principles. The former ex-
plains the rationale of  the responsibility, while the latter 
specifies the means of  implementation. 
3.1.1 State Duty to Protect
The first pillar is the state duty to protect human ri-
46 The Guiding Principles have been endorsed by different inter-
national initiatives by NGOs and international organizations. The 
Working Group, created to develop the implementation of  the 
Guiding Principles, have issued several reports on how the Guiding 
Principle have been embraced in Human Rights Council, Res. 17/4 
Adopted by the Human Rights Council: Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 17th sess., Agenda 
Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, 2011.
47 UN Guiding Principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/docu-
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las vis-
ited 01 August. 2019). 
48 Glendon, Mary Ann. A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights. New York: Random House, 
2003.
49 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Binding Treaty, 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty (last visited 
July 29, 2019).
50 UN Guiding Principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/docu-
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  (Las vis-
ited 01 August. 2019).
ghts of  those that are in its territory and/or jurisdiction 
from third parties, including corporations. The first pi-
llar does not create new international obligations since 
several international human rights instruments recog-
nize the state’s duty to protect.51 Accordingly, the lan-
guage of  the UNGPs has barred from deliberation any 
interpretation of  the principles that attempts to expand 
existing international state obligations.52 Nevertheless, 
it is incorrect to think that the principles of  the first 
pillar only restate existing international law. Although 
the UNGPs help to clarify the state duty to protect with 
respect to third parties, they differ from existing inter-
national law because they establish an additional or hi-
gher duty to protect from corporations that have ties to 
the state. 
The UNGPs clarify the scope of  the duty to protect 
by identifying the ways to discharge those obligations 
through preventive measures (pillar III deals with re-
medies) such as enforcing existing laws; channeling new 
laws into particular corporate law norms, so they do not 
diminish the capacity of  corporation to respect human 
rights;53 formulating policies that incentivize or encou-
rage businesses to respect human rights;54 and ensuring 
coherence among different parts of  the state (e.g. hu-
man rights office and foreign trade).55 The UNGPs also 
51 “These Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of: (a) 
States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” UN Guiding, principle 1; Con-
vention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 2, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, 
at 2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD], Convention on 
the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women, 
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, art. 5, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 17 [hereinafter 
CEDAW]; and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
100- 20, at 1 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 [hereinafter Torture 
Convention].
52 Hence, the UNGPs is not saying that all states are responsible 
for protecting all the internationally recognized human rights of  the 
persons present in their territory or under their jurisdiction from 
third parties. According to international law, only the states that have 
ratified human rights treaties or that are not permanent objectors of  
customary law that impose such obligation are internationally re-
sponsible for protecting the human rights recognized in those trea-
ties from third parties abuses.
53   UN Guiding Principles, principle 1. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019).
54 UN Guiding Principles, principles. See: https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  
(Las visited 01 August. 2019).
55 UN Guiding Principles, principle 8. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
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specify the situation in which states usually lose their 
capacity to meet their international obligations when 
they incorrectly regulate businesses that provide public 
services,56 make contracts with them, or celebrate Bila-
teral Investment Treaties (BITs) which unable states to 
pursue further action to meet their international obli-
gations.57  
None of  this is new, but it is a clarification of  the sta-
te duty to protect. However, the operational principles 
of  the second pillar establish that states have special du-
ties of  regulation in regard to businesses in accordance 
with their closeness to the state and the nature of  their 
activity.58 Closeness to the state here is not a justification 
for corporate responsibility, but a secondary rule that 
determines a situation in which states’ responsibilities 
increase. In other words, although the states are alrea-
dy responsible for protecting human rights from third 
parties under existing IHRL, the operational principles 
allocate a higher responsibility to the state in relation to 
corporations that have a nexus with the state such as 
those owned by, controlled by, or that receive support 
from the state, as well as those that have celebrated con-
tracts with the state or that provide public services by 
state concession.59 Thus, there is a gap between existing 
international law and the UNGPs. Such a gap can be 
seen as a form of  advancing the creation of  new inter-
national norms, whether by a later treaty or by creating 
customary international law. This is precisely one of  the 
roles of  international soft law: to reach consensus in 
areas where there was no previous agreement and to 
start the ongoing process of  voluntary commitments 
that could later be transformed into legal ones. 
3.1.2 Corporate Responsibility to Respect
The second pillar specifies the corporate responsi-
bility to respect human rights. In contrast with the first 
pillar, it is debatable if  the second pillar gathers existing 
56   UN Guiding Principles, principle 5. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019) 
57  UN Guiding Principles, principle 9. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
58 UN Guiding Principles, principle 4. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
59  UN Guiding Principles, principle 4,5. See: https://www.
ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
international norms because there are no international 
norms (hard law) directed towards corporations, whether 
in treaties or customary international law. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the corporate responsibility to res-
pect does not have the same legal status as the norms 
recognized in the first and third pillars. In fact, Ruggie 
did not claim legal authority for pillar two; rather he said 
it was based on social expectations of  business and the 
social license to operate.60  (See Figure 1)
However, different scholars have argued that althou-
gh existing international law is not directed towards cor-
porations because traditionally only states are subjects 
of  international law, existing international law places 
obligations on corporations but does not contemplate a 
form of  implementation or international accountability 
for those obligations.61 Moreover, the general duty to 
respect expressed as a form of  limitation to individual 
rights in the major international human rights instru-
ments applies to every agent in society.62 There is no 
reason to sustain that such an obligation does not apply 
to businesses, in at least a high level of  generality that 
would need further development to be enforced – espe-
cially because it is expressed through international law 
that rises problems of  legal personality, among others. 
The UNGPs are the first international document 
in which the corporate responsibility to respect hu-
man rights (as an independent duty) has been expres-
sly set forth. According to the Report of  the Special 
Representative, “the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights means avoiding the infringement of  the 
rights of  others and addressing adverse impacts that 
may occur”.63 It has three main features. First, it is inde-
pendent from the state capacity to regulate or enforce 
that responsibility; second, it involves all the potential 
human rights impacts produced by the business activi-
60 Ruggie Report, “A Survey of  The Scope”, Add. 2 2008 par. 55.
61 Steven R. Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory 
of  Legal Responsibility.” Yale Law Journal, 2001, 111, pp. 443–546; 
Bernaz, Nadia. Business and Human Rights: History, Law and Policy- 
Bridging the Accountability Gap. New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2016.
62 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of  
Global Markets Symposium: The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 
at 50 and the Challenge of  Global Markets--Keynote Address, 25 Brook. J. 
Int’l L. pp. 17–26, 1999.
63 Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  
Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business 
Enterprises, Human Rights and Corporate Law: Trends and Observations 
from a Cross-National Study conducted by the Special Representative UN. 
Doc.  A/HRC/14/27/Add.2, 2010 (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter 
Ruggie Report Add. 2 2010].
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ties or through its relations with other actors (supply 
chains), which means that it covers direct and indirect 
participation in human rights abuses; and third, its mi-
nimum standards are the already existing human rights 
recognized in the International Bill of  Rights (UDHR, 
ICCPR, ICESCR) and ILO conventions.64  
The formula of  responsibility of  corporations 
adopted in the UNGPs is that corporations have to 
respect (do not harm) all internationally recognized hu-
man rights (as a minimum those recognized in the inter-
national bill of  human rights and ILO conventions),65 
but the corporate responsibility to respect is specified 
through the exercise of  the due diligence developed by 
the same corporation.66 In other words, there is a gene-
ral principle of  responsibility that applies to all corpo-
rations regardless of  size, activity, or location67and with 
respect to all human rights, but the specification of  the 
responsibility depends on the process of  due diligence. 
Therefore, the due diligence process becomes the cen-
tral element of  corporate responsibility. 
The scope of  the corporate responsibility has been 
defined as a duty to respect in contrast with terms of  the 
much wider, previous language used in the UN Sub-
-Commission Norms on the Responsibilities of  Trans-
national Corporations according to which corporations 
“have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment 
of, respect, ensure respect of  and protect human rights 
recognized in international as well as national law”.68 
The language of  respect is a way to define the mini-
mum standard of  corporate responsibility and comes 
from the language used in international human rights 
law treaties to specify states’ duties. For instance, Article 
2.1 of  the ICCPR says that state parties should respect 
human rights, as does Article 1 of  the American Con-
vention. 
64 Ruggie Report Add.2 2010, pp. 57-65. Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]. ICCPR. International Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,1966, art. 11,993 
U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter ICESCR]
65 UN Guiding Principles, commentary to principle 12. https://
www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusi-
nesshr_eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
66 UN Guiding Principles, commentary to principle 17, 18. htt-
ps://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/Guidingprinciples-
Businesshr_eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
67 UN Guiding Principles, commentary to principle 14. https://
www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusi-
nesshr_eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
68 UN Sub-Commission Norms, A.1
Some scholars have argued that corporations are also 
bound by the tripartite obligations of  respect, protect, 
and fulfill, which mirrors the international responsibility 
of  the state.69 However, the UNGPs took a different 
path and narrowed the scope of  corporate responsibi-
lity to respect, while keeping the tripartite typology of  
obligation for states.70  
The obligation to respect, under the tripartite typo-
logy, has been identified as a negative obligation that 
requires abstention, non-interference, non-violation 
or non-infringement of  another’s human rights. In the 
words of  Asbjorn Edie, “the obligation to respect re-
quires the state, and thereby all its organs and agents, to 
abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity 
of  the individual or infringes on her or his freedom, 
including the freedom to use the material resources 
available… to satisfy its basic need.”71 Similarly, the In-
ter-American Court on Human Rights in Velasquez Ro-
driguez defined the obligation to respect found in Article 
1 of  the American Convention as a negative obligation 
that is translated into a limitation or restriction to state 
power,72 which is complemented by the positive obliga-
tions that arise from the obligation to “ensure” included 
in Article 1.1.  
  Respect in the UNGPs means, at a minimum “do 
not harm”. Thus, it would imply that it is mainly a res-
ponsibility of  abstention or non-interference. However, 
the UNGPs also imposes a positive duty of  due diligen-
ce on companies to undertake reasonable efforts to fo-
resee and avoid or mitigate and to remedy human rights 
violations. Accordingly, the language in the UNGPs is 
open to a broader interpretation that might imply to 
international human rights law under the classical tri-
partite typology because it places positive requirements 
of  actions on corporations. For instance, the corporate 
responsibility to respect includes the obligation of  cor-
porations to develop and implement corporate policies 
and nationwide human rights risk assessment and to 
69 Jernej Letnar Černič, “Human Rights Law and Business: Cor-
porate Responsibility for Fundamental Human Rights”; Nicola M. 
Jägers, in Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of  Accountability, 
p. 76, 2002. 
70 UN Guiding Principles, principle 1. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
71 Asbjorn Eide, Realization of  Social and Economic Rights4/24/17 
3:22:00 PM: The Minimum Threshold Approach, 43 I.C.J. Rev. pp. 40–
52, 1989.
72 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of  the Inter-Am. 
CT. H.R, (ser. C) No. 4, 1988
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monitor production through the entire supply chain.73 
In addition, as part of  the responsibility to respect the 
UNGPs derive from an obligation to address adverse 
human rights impacts and offer remedy for violations, 
which evidently are obligations that require more than 
abstention.74 In this sense, as Ruggie himself  said in 
2008, doing no harm is not merely a passive respon-
sibility.75 In fact, the primary means of  discharging the 
responsibility to respect is by conducting a due diligen-
ce process, which is explained below to imply several 
proactive measures by the corporation.76 
Ultimately, the duty to respect is the minimum stan-
dard of  corporate responsibility, which means that in 
some circumstances, corporations might have additio-
nal obligations to protect human rights such as keeping 
workers safe in areas affected by conflict or safe from 
violence in the workplace.77 Although these circums-
tances are exceptional, in such cases the corporate res-
ponsibility scope extends to an obligation to protect, 
which, however, makes the distinction between respect 
and protect unclear. 
The UNGPs specify the corporate responsibility to 
respect according to the relationship of  the business 
institution with the activity in two categories: 1) busi-
nesses’ own activities, and 2) activities directly linked with 
their operations, products, or services, which include all 
supply chain relationships. According to the UNGPs, 
the duty to respect requires of  corporations five types 
of  actions (positive or negative) divided according to 
the kind of  business relationship with the activity ex-
plained above. These actions are to “avoid causing”, 
“avoid contributing”, “address adverse impacts”, “seek 
to prevent”, and “seek to mitigate”.78 
73 Justine Nolan & L Taylor, “Corporate Responsibility for Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in Search of  a Remedy?”, 
in Journal of  Business Ethics pp. 433–451, 2009.
74  UN Guiding Principles, principle 13. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019)
75 Ruggie Report; Special Representative of  the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of  Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and 
Other Business Enterprises, Business and human rights: Towards opera-
tionalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” UN. Doc A/HRC/11/13, 
2009 [hereinafter Ruggie Report 2009] The 2009 report specified 
other positive aspects of  corporate responsibility to respect rights.  
76 Ruggie Report 2008 par. 56.  
77 Ruggie Report 2009 par. 63 –64.
78  UN Guiding Principles, principle 13. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019).
Regarding the corporate responsibility when busi-
nesses act through their own activities, the duty to res-
pect requires that the corporation 1) “avoid causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts”.79 Thus, 
according to the Guiding Principle 13.a, there are two 
forms of  corporate responsibility when businesses act 
through their own activities. The first is through direct 
action, which is, being the cause of  an adverse human 
rights impact. The second is indirect, through any form 
of  contribution to an adverse human rights impact 
committed by a third party. Both of  the obligations 
are obligations to “avoid” which at first glance would 
indicate a negative obligation or a requirement not to 
do something. However, as will be explained below, the 
means of  discharging the obligation to avoid requires 
positive actions mainly through the due diligence pro-
cess. 
The second requirement of  the duty to respect is to 
2) “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights im-
pacts that are directly linked to their [the corporation’s] 
operations, products and services by their business 
relationships”.80 This second specification of  the duty 
to respect is a much wider rule of  responsibility attri-
bution than the first because it includes all business re-
lationships through the supply chain, and the concrete 
requirement of  action is even vaguer than the require-
ment to avoid. The requirement to “seek” might indi-
cate that it is a matter of  means and not of  results. In 
addition, it is a requirement to “prevent” future adverse 
human rights impacts and to “mitigate” past adverse 
human rights. The action of  prevention and mitigation 
is much more than mere avoidance; it is a requirement 
to do something that could include corporate policies, 
social programs, and internal mechanisms to provide 
remedies for victims.  In sum, the scope of  the respon-
sibility to respect is actually to avoid, address, prevent 
and mitigate adverse human rights impacts depending 
on the relationship of  the business institutions with the 
activity (See Figure 2). 
The rule of  attribution under this first requirement 
of  the duty to respect implies an action on the part of  
the corporation: causation or contribution. This is diffe-
79 UN Guiding Principles, principle 13. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019).
80 UN Guiding Principles, principle 13. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019).
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rent from the second requirement according to which 
there might be a violation of  the duty to respect without 
cause or contribution to the harm because omission of  
prevention or lack of  due diligence sufficiently triggers 
the responsibility. In other words, the direct link to the 
third party which is a product of  a lack of  due dili-
gence might be enough to violate the duty to respect. 
Ruggie has clarified that the word “direct” is intended 
to narrow the possible business relationships that can 
trigger corporations’ responsibilities.81 Also, he clarified 
that there must not be “mutual commercial benefit” in 
order for a business relationship be considered a direct 
linkage.82 
The remaining problem and most interesting ques-
tion is: what can be considered the “own activities” of  
a corporation. Does it mean that it has to be part of  
its corporate objectives, or does it refer to any kind of  
activity related to its normal operations? Is securing its 
assets or part of  its own activity? Thus, must adverse 
human rights impacts, for which corporations are res-
ponsible, be part of  the process of  production, distri-
bution, and selling of  its products or services? What 
would happen to, for instance, banks or financial ins-
titutions whose operations or services are limited but 
whose indirect impact is wide?  If  a corporation dedica-
ted to food production were to contract guerilla mem-
bers to protect its assets and in doing so were to cause 
negative impacts on the community where it does busi-
nesses, would it have a direct responsibility even if  that 
contract was not related to its business activity? Might 
it mean activities carried out or authorized by agents of  
the corporation? Or is “activity” another way of  refer-
81 “In drafting the GPs, I sought to protect against overly broad in-
terpretations: at the extreme, “the CEO is friendly with the Minister 
thus the Company is connected to everything abusive the govern-
ment does. Putting the word “directly” before “linked” was intended 
to stress than any abuse must be linked to the company’s operation, 
products, or services, not merely to the fact of  a relationship itself.” 
John Ruggie, OECD Workshop Ruggie Letter, 2015, https://busi-
ness-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/OECD%20
Workshop%20Ruggie%20letter%20-%20Mar%202017_0.pdf. (last 
visited April 12, 2019).
82 “In drafting the GPs, I sought to protect against overly broad in-
terpretations: at the extreme, “the CEO is friendly with the Minister 
thus the Company is connected to everything abusive the govern-
ment does. Putting the word “directly” before “linked” was intended 
to stress than any abuse must be linked to the company’s operation, 
products, or services, not merely to the fact of  a relationship itself.” 
John Ruggie, OECD Workshop Ruggie Letter, 2015, https://busi-
ness-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/OECD%20
Workshop%20Ruggie%20letter%20-%20Mar%202017_0.pdf. (last 
visited April 12, 2019).
ring to actions or decisions while doing businesses, such 
that there is no limitation of  responsibility in accordan-
ce with the kind of  activities the corporation “owns”?83 
(Figure 1)
3.1.3 Effective Remedies
The third pillar of  the UNGPs is access to an effec-
tive remedy for victims of  corporate abuses. This pillar 
allocates obligations to both states and corporations. 
The pillar distinguishes between state-based and non-
-state-based remedial mechanisms, and within state 
mechanisms, it distinguishes between judicial and non-
-judicial mechanisms. The relevance of  this pillar is that 
it matches state and corporate responsibility with the 
right of  victims to an effective remedy, and it provides 
effectiveness criteria to evaluate the plurality of  non-
-judicial remedial mechanisms.84 
Through the inclusion of  this pillar, the UNGPs 
overcame the debate of  voluntarism that has characte-
rized the BHR movement since the 1990s adding legal 
consequences for corporate noncompliance to the lan-
guage of  responsibility (which is already a way to clarify 
that respect to human rights law is not a matter of  illu-
minated self-interest or goodwill). The pillar is unders-
tood as an extension of  the state’s duty to protect from 
third parties, which is based on existing international 
law and thus has important legal weight. 
There are four mechanisms to implement the 
UNGPs. Firstly, these principles, especially the 
responsibility to respect, could be implemented as 
a matter of  corporate governance on the basis of  
self-regulation and voluntary corporate compliance. 
Alternatively, they could be implemented through 
the incorporation of  the UNGPs’ substantive 
standards into other international initiatives as 
has occurred with the OECD Guidelines or the 
ISO norms. Secondly, as with all international law 
systems that have been created, the state is expected 
to implement these norms through domestic law, 
in particular through “national action plans”. Third, 
another path of  implementation of  the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights is through the 
incorporation of  this duty into the jurisprudence of  
83 This seems to be a question about the even deeper or more 
detailed specification of  the responsibility depending on the activity 
of  the business. The principle of  responsibility is “property”, owned 
directly, different from the principle “the activity for it was created” 
or social reason.
84 UN Guiding Principles. Principle 13. See: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf  (Las visited 01 August. 2019).
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other regional human rights tribunals, such as the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights. Fourth, 
the last path of  implementation is the development 
of  new international law based on the UNGPs 
standards through the creation of  a treaty or 
customary international law. 
3.2 National Action Plans (NAPs)
In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council issued two 
resolutions to propose different possible ways to imple-
ment the UNGPs: National Action Plans (NAPs) and 
a legal binding treaty.85 The NAPs “are government-
-drafted policy documents that articulate state priorities 
and indicate future actions to support the implementa-
tion of  legal obligations or policy commitments on a 
given topic”,86 which were previously employed in other 
policy areas including general human rights implemen-
tation. After five years of  the UNGP endorsement, the 
NAPs are its most relevant impact as a soft law instru-
ment. Several countries have launched NAPs and seve-
ral others have initiated the process of  consultation and 
development of  their plans. In 2018, a total of  thirteen 
countries have developed NAPs. The first NAP was de-
veloped by the UK, the next by the Netherlands in 2013, 
followed by Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, and 
Norway over the next two years. In 2016, Switzerland, 
Italy, the USA, and Germany launched their respective 
NAPs.87 Colombia was the first Latin-American country 
that has launched a NAP in 2016.88In addition, civil so-
85 Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/RES/26/22, 2014 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Resolutions-
Decisions.aspx.
86 Claire Methven O’Brien., National Action Plans: Current Status and 
Future Prospects for a New Business and Human Rights Governance Tool, 
1 Bus. and hum. rights j. Business and Human Rights Journal pp. 
117-118, 2016.
87 Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights, State 
national action plans, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited July 29, 2019) There 
are current NAPs processes taking place/being formed in France, 
Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Scotland and Slovenia. Non-Eu-
ropean countries that are working on NAPs include Argentina, Aus-
tralia Azerbaijan, Chile, Guatemala, Greece, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, and Thailand.
88 Consejería de Derechos Humanos, Plan de Acción de Derechos Hu-
manos y Empresas, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Busi-
ness/NationalPlans/PNA_Colombia_9dic.pdf  (last visited July 29, 
2019).
ciety groups,89the Working Group,90and the UN Global 
Compact91have published draft guidelines for develo-
ping NAPs.
The problem of  current NAPs is that most of  them 
are largely “declaratory of  existing measures and com-
mitments, with few hard promises to take new action.”92 
This is due in part to the nature of  NAPs which are 
only governance tools that help promote convergence 
between standards where there is no clarity of  the legal 
obligation; they also bring domestic laws, policies, and 
practices into alignment with international norms (even 
if  they are soft law).93 In other words, NAP formation 
is a way of  setting goals, promoting dynamic coopera-
tion between different local stakeholders, and working 
toward stronger commitments, but it does not impose 
legal obligations on corporations. Because of  this, some 
have argued that NAPs are a waste of  resources that 
could be better invested in advocacy for other forms 
of  implementation such as naming and shaming, repor-
ting, or mandatory due diligence.94
On the other hand, some NAPs are a reaffirmation 
of  the corporate duty to respect, which is not only a 
step forward in the implementation of  that duty throu-
gh domestic law but also a way to demonstrate state 
practice that could later develop customary interna-
tional law.95 In addition, NAPs have been strategically 
89 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable & Dan-
ish Institute for Human Rights, “National Action Plans on Busi-
ness and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Imple-
mentation, and Review of  State Commitments to Business and 
Human Rights Frameworks”, 2014, https://www.icar.ngo/publi-
cations/2017/1/4/national-action-plans-on-business-and-human-
rights-a-toolkit-for-the-development-implementation-and-review-
of-state-commitments-to-business-and-human-rights-frameworks 
(last visited April 12, 2019) [Hereinafter ICAR & DIHR, National 
Action Plans on Business and Human Rights].
90 Working Group on The Issue of  Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guidance on Na-
tional Action Plans on Business and Human Rights, version 1.0, http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAP-
Guidance.pdf  2014.
91 UN Global Compact, Guidance for Global Compact Local Networks 
on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights, https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/library/5151 (last visited July 29, 2019).
92 O’Brien, “National Action Plans”, p. 118.
93 O’Brien, “National Action Plans”, p. 117-118.
94 ICAR & DIHR, National Action Plans on Business and Hu-
man Rights; Robert McCorquodale, “Expecting business to respect 
human rights without incentives or Sanctions UK Human Rights 
Blog”,  https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/09/04/expecting-
business-to-respect-human-rights-without-incentives-or-sanctions-
robert-mccorquodale/  2014. (last visited July 29, 2019).
95 Government of  Sweden, “Action Plan for Business and Hu-
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effective in encouraging the business sector’s voluntary 
commitment to the UNGPs.96 
Beyond NAPs, some examples of  other domestic 
measures created to address negative human rights im-
pacts are the UK Modern Slavery Act which requires 
every corporation with a total global annual turnover of  
£36million that performs business (or part of  a busi-
ness) in the UK to produce a slavery and human traffi-
cking statement for each financial year.97 Others include 
the Dodd-Frank Act that requires corporations to re-
port on the sources of  minerals used in their products 
that originated from the Democratic Republic of  Con-
go or adjoining countries,98 or the recent French law 
that establishes a duty of  care obligation for parent and 
subcontracting companies.99 These domestic measures 
are part of  the interesting matrix of  national and in-
ternational development in the BHR field based on the 
UNGPs which also include guidelines, benchmarking, 
and joint action platforms.100 
3.3 Treaty on BHR
In 2013 in response to the nonconformity of  some 
governments and human rights communities to the 
“softness” of  the UNGPs, Ecuador (with the support 
of  85 other countries) urged the UN Human Rights 
Council to consider developing a binding legal instru-
ment on business and human rights.101 The claimed 
man Rights”, http://www.government.se/contentassets/822dc479
52124734b60daf1865e39343/action-plan-for-business-and-human-
rights.pdf. 2015.
96 United States Council for International Business, Global Busi-
ness Initiative on Human Rights & UN Global Compact et.al, 
“Statement on National Action Plans on Business and Human 
Rights”, Session at the UN Annual Forum on Business and Human 
Rights, http://www.global-business-initiative.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/11/NAPs-Statement-Nov-2016.pdf   .2016.
97 “UK Modern Slavery Act”, https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/modern-slavery-bill ,2015.
98 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Implementation 
of  US Dodd-Frank Act rule on conflict minerals: Commentaries, 
guidance, company actions”, https://business-humanrights.org/
en/conflict-peace/conflict-minerals/implementation-of-us-dodd-
frank-act-rule-on-conflict-minerals-commentaries-guidance-com-
pany-actions (last visited July 29, 2019).
99 Lucia Ortiz, “France Adopts Corporate Duty of  Care Law, 
Friends of  the Earth International”, http://www.foei.org/press/
france-adopts-corporate-duty-care-law (last visited July 29, 2019).
100 World Business Council on Sustainable Development, “Busi-
ness & Human Rights: From Principles to Action”,  http://www.
wbcsd.org/Clusters/Social-Impact/Resources/Business-Human-
Rights-From-Principles-to-Action.  2016.
101 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Calls for a bind-
to desire a binding law more effective than voluntary 
mechanisms to overcome businesses’ resistance to ac-
countability, an issue commonly presented in the imple-
mentation of  soft law mechanism such as the UNGPs. 
At the end of  2013, more than 600 civil society groups 
joined the call for a legally binding treaty.102 
John Ruggie has been skeptical of  an all-encompas-
sing “silver bullet” treaty that could address all the pro-
blems related to negative corporate human rights im-
pacts.103 Some of  his reasons for questioning the treaty 
path come from the observation that “human rights 
treaties are least effective in the case of  those countries 
where they are needed most”104 because those countries 
are unwilling or unable to enforce their international 
obligations, which is precisely the regulatory challen-
ge as explained above. Thus, adding another interna-
tional obligation on host states is either “redundant or 
irrelevant”.105 In addition, he argues that any treaty ca-
pable of  addressing all the national and international 
issues related with the business and human rights field 
would have to be at a very high level of  abstraction with 
very little practical use to real people in real places.106 
Moreover, since the treaty would be so abstract, every 
state would approach enforcement in different ways 
producing “confusion and conflicting outcomes, not 
uniform practices.”107 Ultimately, Ruggie is expressing 
ing treaty on business & human rights – perspectives”, 2013 htt-
ps://business-humanrights.org/en/calls-for-a-binding-treaty-on-
business-human-rights-perspectives (last visited July 29, 2019).
102 Cassel Douglass  & Ramasastry Anita , White Paper: Options for 
a Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 6 Notre Dame J. Int’l Comp. 
L. 1, p. 10, 2016.
103  John Ruggie  , “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business 
and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 
2014, https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-
rights/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-
treaty-sponsors (last visited July 29, 2019); John Ruggie, “A Business 
and Human Rights Treaty? International legalisation As Precision 
Tools”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 2014, https://www.ihrb.org/
other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/a-business-and-human-
rights-treaty-international-legalisation-as-precision (last visited July 
29, 2019).
104 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations 
and Human Rights (2013)  p. 61.
105 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations 
and Human Rights (2013)  p. 61.
106 John Ruggie, “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and 
Human Rights Treaty Sponsors”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 2014, 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/
quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-treaty-
sponsors (last visited July 29, 2019).
107 John Ruggie, “A Business and Human Rights Treaty? Interna-
tional legalisation As Precision Tools”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 
2014, https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-
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concern about the possibility of  states using the trea-
ty negotiation as an excuse not to advance in the im-
plementation of  the UNGPs since all their efforts are 
invested in the treaty negotiation process. His concern 
arises from the fact that “most states that voted in fa-
vor of  initiating treaty negotiations have done little if  
anything to implement and promote the UNGPs wi-
thin their own countries, regions, or globally”,108 while 
the countries opposing the treaty (see below) have done 
more in this matter, in particular, European countries. 
Nevertheless, Ruggie is not at all against a treaty 
but only against the idea that the treaty is the one and 
ultimate solution to the corporate problem. He pre-
dicts that Ecuador’s proposal might end in one of  two 
ways: either the negotiation takes too long (a decade 
or more), and ends like previous norms with no real 
effect, or “they manage to persuade enough developing 
countries to adopt such a treaty text, but which home 
countries of  most TNCs do not ratify and, therefore, 
are not bound by”.109 In order to avoid ending in one of  
these situations, he suggested that the treaty should not 
be limited to TNCs, should create an intergovernmental 
working group that could advance a treaty draft, include 
all sectors including business in the process, and not 
stop implementing the UNGP during the treaty nego-
tiation process.110 
In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council established 
an Intergovernmental Working Group to elaborate 
a treaty to regulate the activities of  TNCs and other 
business enterprises. Twenty members of  the Council 
supported the initiative, fourteen states opposed it, and 
thirteen abstained. The opposing states were mainly 
European states, the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of  
Korea.111 The reasons that motivated the opposition 
were the unnecessary polarization that this could bring 
rights/a-business-and-human-rights-treaty-international-legalisa-
tion-as-precision (last visited July 29, 2019).
108 John Ruggie, “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and 
Human Rights Treaty Sponsors”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 2014, 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/
quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-treaty-
sponsors (last visited July 29, 2019).
109 John Ruggie  , “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and 
Human Rights Treaty Sponsors”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 2014, 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/
quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-treaty-
sponsors (last visited July 29, 2019).
110 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 10.
111 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
RES/26/9, ¶ 1 (July 29, 2019). 
to the field, the unsuitability of  an overacting instru-
ment to face the complexities of  business activities, the 
limitation that the treaty would only bind state parties, 
the problem of  corporate legal personality on interna-
tional law, and that local businesses would be left outsi-
de the treaty according to the resolution.112  
The spectrum of  possibilities in the content of  the 
treaty oscillates between minimal obligations such as 
public reporting and disclosure and provisions for legal 
liability that could find effective remedy through civil 
and/or criminal procedures in national courts or in an 
international tribunal.113 Professors Doug Cassel and 
Anita Ramasastry classified the various treaty options 
into four categories: treaties mandating national action, 
treaties establishing international enforcement machi-
nery, treaties that would mandate states to amend their 
laws to ensure consistency with their duty to protect 
human rights, and treaties tailored to particular business 
sectors or specific human rights violations.114 
Although there are many different treaty options, 
there are some ideas that might help limit the number 
of  options available. For instance, the range of  rights 
covered by the treaty will increase or decrease based on 
the kind of  duties imposed by the treaty and enforce-
ment mechanisms. The harder or stronger the mecha-
nisms, the fewer rights there are that can be reasonably 
covered by the treaty. Thus, if  any treaty obligations are 
reporting, planning, or implementing could reasonably 
cover all the human rights recognized in the Internatio-
nal Bill, but a treaty that imposes criminal sanctions to 
corporations would only be able to cover those rights 
protected through recognized international crimes.115 
Furthermore, a treaty that would not contemplate 
“legally enforceable corporate accountability and access 
of  victims to remedies”116 will not achieve what the pro-
ponents of  the treaty (Ecuador and South Africa) seek 
through this instrument. Therefore, a treaty that impo-
112 Statement by the Delegation of  the U.S., Explanation of  
vote on the resolution of  the Human Rights Council, Res. A/
HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 available at: Proposed Working Group Would 
Undermine Efforts to Implement Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, US Mission Geneva, https://geneva.usmission.
gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-
efforts-to-implement-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-
rights/ (last visited Aug 24, 2017).
113 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 18-19.
114 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 119.
115 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 42-43.
116 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 25.
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ses only non-binding individual petition systems, moni-
toring bodies, or mere reporting and disclosure obliga-
tions would not suffice for this purpose. However, the 
stronger the sanctions and enforcement mechanism, 
the harder will it be to find consensus among countries. 
In addition, a solution to the problem of  abstraction 
in a framework treaty pointed out by Ruggie might be a 
combination between a framework treaty and optional 
protocols tailored to a specific sector or human right or 
establishing particular enforcement mechanisms. This 
was the treaty model of  the international legal regime 
on the ozone layer.117
Among the different treaty options, Ruggie argues 
that the most reasonable one would be a treaty that 
addresses jus cogens norms violations or those most se-
rious human rights violations such as crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, forced labor, torture, and extrajudicial 
killings.118 This kind of  treaty would have a wider level 
of  agreement among international actors since there 
are good reasons for arguing that existing international 
law already allocates obligations on non-state actors to 
respect these “core” norms.119 Nevertheless, he accepts 
that such a treaty would not include the broad spectrum 
of  human rights violations in which business entities 
are involved. The same kind of  objection can be applied 
to those treaties that would create direct liability for re-
cognized international crimes either through national 
or international prosecution.120 An alternative solution 
would be the model embraced by the New Protocol to 
the African Court of  Justice and Human Rights121which 
117 For a discussion of  Framework Treaties. Cassel & Ramasastry, 
“White Paper”, p. 24-25.
118 John Ruggie, “A Business and Human Rights Treaty? Interna-
tional legalisation As Precision Tools”, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus, 
2014, https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-
rights/a-business-and-human-rights-treaty-international-legalisa-
tion-as-precision (last visited July 29, 2019).
119 Nicola M. Jägers, “Corporate Human Rights Obligations” p. 
46, 2002. For instance, in Doe v. Unocal, 1997 the United States Court 
of  Appeals of  the ninth circuit found responsible Unocal for violat-
ing international human rights norms that amount to breaches of  
jus cogens in Myanmar subjecting peasants to a forced labor program 
as part of  a project to build a pipeline to transport natural gas from 
Myanmar’s coast through the country until Thailand.  The Court 
stated that forced labor is one of  the “handful of  crimes ... to which 
the law of  nations attributes individual liability,” such that state action 
is not required.
120 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, pp. 26-27; 36-37. 
121 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of  the 
African Court of  Justice and Human Rights, 27 June 2014, accessi-
ble at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ PROTOCOL%20
0N%20AMENDMENTS%20TOX20THE%20PROTOCOL%20
expands the list of  crimes that corporations can commit 
and clarifies that legal persons can be directly prosecu-
ted for those crimes.122 The problem with this model is 
that it will not obtain the same kind of  consensus that 
the first one could, nor will it even obtain the same legal 
support since there is still much disagreement about the 
type of  crimes corporations can directly commit under 
international law.123 
The most controversial treaty model would be one 
that directly allocates responsibility to corporations, by 
which states would accept that all TNCs under their 
jurisdiction are subjected to some defined obligations 
with respect to human rights and might be directly liable 
under such a treaty whether in domestic courts or a new 
international tribunal. It is controversial because it im-
plies a silent revolution since corporations would be di-
rectly bound by international law and not only domestic 
law. Olivier De Schutter, argues that such a treaty could 
be conceived by analogy to the ICC statute, except this 
one would be tailored to serious human rights violations 
committed by corporations or in which corporations 
are complicit.124 Thus, in its scope, that kind of  treaty 
would be very much like the one proposed by Ruggie. 
This is different from the proposal of  the International 
Commission of  Jurists of  a treaty that could obligate to 
pass a national law to require corporations to respect 
human rights because under this option corporations 
would not have s direct international obligation, they 
only have to obey domestic law of  the country where 
they are incorporated.125 
0N%20THE%20AFRICAN20COURT 20-%20EN_0.pdf. (Not in 
force yet).
122 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 36.
123 Andrew Claphamn argues that the lack of  jurisdiction to try 
a corporation does not mean that the corporation does not have 
a direct legal obligation or that we cannot say that the corporation 
has breached international law. It means that the obligation must be 
enforced through different forums, e.g. national domestic courts, in-
ternational human rights treaty monitoring bodies, or even through 
mechanism made under non-binding schemes for investigation such 
as that of  the OECD. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in The Private 
Sphere p. 178, 1993. In United States of  America, Court of  Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, Presbytarian Church of  Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 289, S.D.N.Y. 2003 the argued that in-
ternational norms that bind private individuals do not directly apply 
to corporations but only to their owners or managers.
124 De Schutter, “Towards a New Treaty”, p. 59.
125 International Commission of  Jurists, “Proposals for Elements 
of  a Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises”, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/Universal-OEWG-session-2-ICJ-submission-
Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2016-ENG.pdf  .2016.
LO
PE
Z
, A
nd
re
s F
eli
pe
. C
on
te
m
po
ra
ry
 re
sp
on
se
s t
o 
bu
sin
es
se
s’ 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts
 im
pa
ct
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
17
, n
. 1
, p
.3
40
-3
61
, 2
02
0
357
Other different issues that might have to be dealt 
with in a treaty would be: the scope of  corporate reaso-
nability between parent companies and their subsidia-
ries; the rights and type of  business entities covered by 
the instrument; the clarification of  the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of  state and of  the legal standards to deter-
mine complicity (e.g. knowledge, purpose test); direct 
responsibility (e.g. negligence); and the obligation to 
overcome the corporate veil.126 
The Intergovernmental Working Group has held 
four sessions. The last session took place on October 
2018. In September 2017, the Chair of  the working 
group issued a document titled “Elements for the 
draft legally binding instrument” which constitutes the 
basis for further negotiations to elaborate a treaty on 
BHR, and a Zero Draft (followed by its draft Optional 
Protocol) was presented in July 2018.127 
Some of  the elements to highlight of  draft legally 
binding instrument are: 1) it suggests a treaty not only 
for TNCs but also to regulate other business enterpri-
ses (OBE) that can harm human rights; 2) it reaffirms 
the primary responsibility of  the state to protect human 
rights; 3) the obligations proposed are directed toward 
states and TNCs independently; 4) one of  the main 
obligations of  the state will be to ensure domestic civil, 
administrative and criminal liability of  TNCs regarding 
human rights abuses, and to adopt legislation to ensure 
the TNCs adopt and implement due diligence proces-
ses; 5) the main obligation directed to TNCs are mainly 
those set forth in the UNGPs; 6) the term “under the 
jurisdiction” of  the state means not only that a TNC 
is incorporated in that state but also that is registered, 
has its headquarters, or has substantive activities in the 
state concerned;128 and 7) proposes that states should 
consider different mechanism of  implementation and 
monitoring of  the future treaty obligations including an 
International Court on Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights or create special chambers on existing 
126 Cassel & Ramasastry, “White Paper”, p. 39-49.
127 Human Rights Council, Report on the thirds session of  the open-end-
ed intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights UN. Doc. A/HRC/26/9 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Ses-
sion3/Pages/Session3.aspx.
128 Human Rights Council, Report on the thirds session of  the open-end-
ed intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights UN. Doc. A/HRC/26/9 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Ses-
sion3/Pages/Session3.aspx.
international and regional Human Rights Courts dedi-
cated to adjudicating on this issues.129 
The elements for the draft of  a treaty on TNCs and 
other business enterprises with respect to human rights 
has various relevant characteristic that are worthy to hi-
ghlight about the scope of  application rationae personae, 
the explicit hierarchy of  international law specified in 
the treaty, the rights covered, the substantial obligation 
included in the treaty – in particular in regard with o 
the problematic exercise of  national jurisdiction extra-
territorially-, and the implementation mechanism of  the 
treaty that includes the possible creation of  an interna-
tional tribunal. 
First, the draft treaty is designed in order to include 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enter-
prises regardless of  its size, structure, mode of  creation 
or control. What defines the scope of  application ratio-
nae personae is the transnational character of  the activity 
performed by these entities. Although this is a positive 
sign since it overcomes the complex discussion about 
the type of  business association that should be regu-
lated (e.g. multinationals or transnational) this delimi-
tation of  the scope of  application of  the treaty leaves 
out national corporations with a very relevant social im-
pact and capacity to elude state control. A reasonable 
explanation of  such limitation is the reaffirmation of  
the primary duty of  the state to regulate, investigate and 
sanction violations of  human rights committed within 
its territory or jurisdiction, while international law main 
concern is human rights violations that are transnatio-
nal in character. 
Second, the draft treaty has adopted the formula of  
the UNGP that includes all recognized human rights ra-
ther than specifying the most commonly violated rights 
or choosing for the option of  a treaty that sanctions the 
most serious or grave human rights violations following 
the model of  the Rome Statute. This is of  relevance 
because, from a realistic point of  view, the wider the 
material scope of  the treaty will be, the weaker will have 
to be the sanctioning mechanisms. 
Third, regarding the obligations enshrined in the 
draft treaty, the drafters have reaffirmed the relevan-
129 Human Rights Council, Report on the thirds session of  the open-
ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights UN. Doc. A/HRC/26/9 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Ses-
sion3/Pages/Session3.aspx.
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ce of  the primary responsibility of  States to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties including 
corporations (article 3), while TNCs and OBEs have an 
independent obligation from the state’s obligations to 
“comply with all applicable laws and respect internatio-
nally recognized human rights, wherever they operate, 
and throughout their supply chains” (article 3.2). The 
language clearly entails mandatory obligations instead 
of  a guiding principle for private entities. Accordingly, 
TCNs and OBEs are being treated as subjects (or at 
least participants) of  international law since they can 
bear international obligations. However, this is not a 
complete revolution to classic general international law 
because the implementation mechanism of  the obliga-
tion remains at the head of  the state (article 3.1). 
In addition, it must be highlighted that article 3 ex-
pands businesses’ obligation to respect established in 
the UNGP to an obligation of  using their influence to 
promote and ensure respect of  human rights, which is 
beyond from the notion of  respect previously explai-
ned. This could be translated into, for instance, interna-
tional responsibility of  TNCs for their failure to promo-
te a culture of  human rights within their organization. 
From the outset, this seems controversial because of  
the expansion of  the limited and discrete responsibility 
to respect of  the UNGPs. 
The model adopted in the draft treaty is to create 
obligations of  internal legislation for states parties in 
order to enforce TCNs and OBEs’ human rights obli-
gations. Some of  these legislative or administrative 
measures include: periodically report, an obligation to 
perform human rights and environmental impact as-
sessments, include human rights clauses in their procu-
rement contracts, and require corporations to oversee 
their supply chains to prevent human rights abuses. The 
process of  internalization of  international legal stan-
dards is a common form of  enforcement of  internatio-
nal law, and in various ways, an effective form because 
states and non-state actors are much more willing to 
obey domestic law than international law itself. 130For 
the time being, it would be unreal to expect that inter-
national law could allocate international obligations and 
sanctions to non-state actors without the necessary in-
130 Harold Hongju Koh, Regarding the idea of  internalization as 
a necessary process of  enforcement of  international law, see , “Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law Review Essay,” Yale Law Jour-
nal, no. 8 (1997 1996): 2599–2660.
tervention of  states.131  
Fourth, the draft treaty is based on the premise that 
a hierarchy among international law regimes exists gi-
ving prevalence to human rights over international tra-
de or investment law. Moreover, the draft treaty explici-
tly affirms that states shall take the necessary measures 
to take “into account the primacy of  human rights over 
pecuniary or other interests of  corporations.” (article 
3.1). This means that not only international law has a 
hierarchy over other regimes, but that corporations’ in-
terest themselves should be subjected to the primacy of  
human rights.  
Fifth, the draft treaty includes a section on the legal 
liability of  TNCs and OBEs which is one of  the main 
differences with the UNGPs because the treaty would 
not only be a binding instrument, but also one that as-
certains corporate legal responsibility for human rights 
abuses. Legal liability could be criminal, civil or adminis-
trative. Regarding criminal responsibility, the draft as-
serts that states shall create criminal liability or its equi-
valent for TNCs and OBEs subject to their jurisdiction. 
However, such criminal liability could not preclude the 
individual responsibility of  those involved in the deci-
sion-making process within the corporation. The civil 
legal liability should be independent of  criminal liability 
and vice versa, and states shall create legislation which 
precludes TCNs and OBEs to benefit from privileges 
and immunities granted by international law. 132 
Although the treaty does not contemplate the exer-
cise of  extraterritorial jurisdiction to establish legal 
liability for TNCs and OBEs, it incorporates a wide 
notion of  jurisdiction. Article 7 defines that under the 
jurisdiction of  the state it is included a TNC “which 
has its center of  activity, is registered or domiciled, or 
is headquartered or has substantial activities in the State 
concerned, or whose parent or controlling company presents such 
a connection to the State concerned” (article 7). Accordingly, 
131 The discussion about the possibility of  allocate direct interna-
tional obligations on corporations, and other non-state actors has 
been a delicate matter subjected to intense academic debate. See gen-
erally, Carlos Manuel Vásquez, “Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of  
Corporations under International Law,” Columbia Journal of  Transna-
tional Law. 433 (2005): 927–59.
132 The discussion about the possibility of  allocate direct interna-
tional obligations on corporations, and other non-state actors has 
been a delicate matter subjected to intense academic debate. See gen-
erally, Carlos Manuel Vásquez, “Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of  
Corporations under International Law,” Columbia Journal of  Transna-
tional Law. 433 (2005): 5-6.
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the draft treaty extends, and even contradicts, natio-
nal norms in different states because it extends state 
jurisdiction over the actions of  the subsidiaries of  the 
parent or controlling company which has substantive 
connections to the state. In addition, the draft treaty 
established that the rule that grants jurisdiction over the 
abuses could be either the forum where the harm oc-
curred or where the corporations are incorporated or 
have a substantial presence. 
Ultimately, the draft treaty contemplates the possi-
bility that State parties create an international tribunal 
or special chambers in existing international or regio-
nal Courts devoted to Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights. In addition, it encourages international 
cooperation through the creation of  new multilateral or 
bilateral treaties in order to strengthen mutual coope-
ration to advance national judicial procedures against 
corporations. 
4 Conclusion 
This article has shown the complexity of  the corpo-
rate problem due to the different forms in which cor-
porations can harm human rights, the variety of  rights 
that can be violated, and the insufficiency of  domestic 
law to regulate what traditionally has been a creature 
of  the state. It has also critically described the diffe-
rent attempts of  the international community in order 
to address the governance gap created by globalization 
and the modern corporate practices that harm human 
rights. 
The UNGPs have become the focus of  the BHR 
movement. Evidence of  this is that all other internatio-
nal initiatives such as International Soft law, and Multi 
Stakeholders Initiatives (MSI)133, the NAPs or even the 
treaty assume as a departure point Ruggie’s work whe-
ther to differentiate from it or to embrace it. 
133 Multi Stakeholders Initiatives (MSIs) started as codes of  con-
duct specific to corporations or were drafted exclusively by industry. 
Later these codes of  conduct evolved into MSIs that include a wider 
spectrum of  participants and topics. They involve various actors 
such as workers’ representatives, consumer groups, customers, in-
vestors, NGOs, businesses, and governments. In recent years they 
have multiplied, but there is no clear form of  categorization or reg-
istry. Some MSIs are industry oriented, and others are multi-industry 
or universal, but all are intended to address the challenges of  gov-
ernance gaps and to enhance dialogue among different stakeholders.
Although the BHR movement is young, it has im-
pressively grown in the past decade. It transverses diffe-
rent legal regimes and exemplifies the complex and so-
metimes unclear separation between public and private 
spheres. This article has explored several of  the legal and 
non-legal initiatives that address businesses’ responsibi-
lity for human rights. However, several other initiatives 
have been omitted such as non-financial disclosures,134 
contractualization of  human rights,135 international tra-
de and investment law mechanism,136 possible investiga-
tions of  corporate managers by the International Crimi-
nal Court,137 and transnational criminal litigation.138 To 
describe and explain all these other possible forms of  
redressing human rights wrongs committed by corpora-
tions exceeds the limits of  this article.
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